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cost functions, and budget constraints. We 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positive, existence requires only the usual concavity assumptions. Information structures that satisfy
our conditions for uniqueness include independent private valuations, correlated private values, pure
common values, and examples of interdependent valuations. The results allow dealing with inactive
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1. Introduction
Contest theory has emerged from the study of important economic problems in areas such as mar-
keting, lobbying, patent races, R&D, legal disputes, promotion tournaments, political campaigning,
sports, and military conict.1 As one of its main objectives, the literature has sought to characterize
the extent of rent dissipation in equilibrium, i.e., the share of the rent that is spent by the competing
parties in an attempt to win the contest. Of some value for such analysis, however, is typically also
the assurance that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists and is unique. Indeed, the existence of
a unique equilibrium is generally a useful property, for reasons such as analytical convenience, pre-
dictive power, comparative statics, and global stability. For contests with incomplete information,
however, there has been a severe lack of general results.2
This paper o¤ers general conditions su¢ cient for the existence and uniqueness of pure-strategy
and mixed-strategy Nash equilibria in incomplete-information contests over arbitrary nite state
spaces. In the class of contests considered, players may possess private information about the prim-
itives of the conict, such as the contest technology, valuations of the prize, cost functions, and
budget constraints. Our assumptions directly generalize the conditions formulated by Szidarovszky
and Okuguchi (1997). Thus, we deal with contests of the logit form, for which Tullocks (1980)
rent-seeking game is an important example. Regarding existence, we show that a pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium exists in a large class of discontinuous incomplete-information contests, provided that
no player ever considers it possible that she is the only one with a positive budget. This result
is obtained through a simple limit consideration that uses a sequence of contests with smaller and
smaller minimum bids. Indeed, under the assumptions that will be imposed, the discontinuity at the
origin does not matter, essentially because small positive bids in a contest of the logit form create
very strong incentives to overbid.3
As in the case of existence, there has likewise been very little work on the uniqueness of an
equilibrium in a contest with incomplete information. A notable exception is the seminal paper on
contests with two-sided incomplete information, Hurley and Shogren (1998b). Considering a private
valuations framework with two players, where one player has two types and the other player has three
types, they have shown that there is at most one interior equilibrium. However, their application of
1See Corchón (2007) for an introduction to the theory of contests.
2The related literature is discussed below.
3To deal with the existence problem, one may alternatively assume that strategy spaces are discrete (see, e.g., Singh
and Wittman, 1988). However, that assumption tends to make uniqueness unlikely, even under complete information.
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the index approach is quite involved, and it is not obvious that it could be generalized. Even if a
generalization is feasible, boundary equilibria would remain a possibility. Another notable exception
is Wasser (2013a) who proves uniqueness in a class of IPV contests with continuous and strictly
concave payo¤ functions. However, that result requires parametric assumptions.4
Regarding uniqueness, our contribution consists of four main elements. First, we point out that,
under commonly used assumptions on technologies and costs, any n-player logit contest satises the
conditions of Goodman (1980) on the interior of the set of strategy proles.5 While useful, this obser-
vation alone does not deliver uniqueness via Rosens (1965) theorem because popular specications
of the logit contest with a discontinuity at the origin do not satisfy the assumptions of that theorem.
For example, in a Tullock contest, payo¤ functions are neither strictly concave nor continuous, which
invalidates an application of Rosens theorem.6 As a second element, therefore, the present paper
extends Rosens diagonally strict concavenotion so as to allow for a wider class of games. Thirdly,
we identify a simple distributional assumption that ensures that the uniqueness proof goes through.
Thereby, we can deal not only with independent private valuations, correlated private values, and
pure common values, but also with examples of interdependent valuations. Finally, we show that
any unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is unique also in the larger set of mixed-strategy Nash
equilibria.
Several papers have stressed the role of budget constraints for the outcome of contests.7 To
account for this important possibility, our framework allows for type-dependent budget constraints.
This creates a large variety of modeling choices. For example, under the standard assumption of
strictly increasing and convex cost functions, a types budget may be so generous that it is never
binding. At the opposite extreme, any type with a zero budget will be e¤ectively excluded from
being active in the contest. This may then be used to cover, in particular, the case of population
uncertainty. Further, depending on the specication of the model, a player with a zero budget may
still have a positive probability to win, as might happen with the proceeds from a charity event.
4To prove uniqueness, Wasser (2013a) employs techniques due to Mason and Valentinyi (2010).
5Franke and Öztürk (2015, p. 105) have applied Goodmans result to networks of two-player contests with contin-
uous technologies and complete information. However, as they emphasize, their proof crucially relies on the additive
separability of payo¤s across opponents, which is not satised in our framework.
6For the same reasons, Uis (2016, Cor. 6) recent extension of Rosens theorem actually fails to apply to Tullocks
rent-seeking game.
7For example, Leininger (1991) has emphasized the role of research budgets for the persistence of monopoly. In
the literature on lobbying caps (Che and Gale, 1998), the introduction of spending limits reduces preemption and may
thereby increase the expected revenue of a politician. Konrad (2012) has studied the formation of alliances, where the
members of an alliance share private information about their respective budget constraints.
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Alternatively, a player may, together with a zero budget constraint, also have a zero probability of
winning the prize.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The related literature is discussed in Section
2. Section 3 introduces the set-up. Existence is dealt with in Section 4, whereas Section 5 discusses
uniqueness. Section 6 considers symmetric contests. Illustrations are provided in Section 7. Section
8 concludes. All proofs have been relegated to an Appendix.
2. Related literature
The existence and uniqueness of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in imperfectly discriminating con-
tests has been studied quite thoroughly in the case of complete information (e.g., Pérez-Castrillo and
Verdier, 1992; Baye et al., 1993; Szidarovszky and Okuguchi, 1997; Esteban and Ray, 1999; Cornes
and Hartley, 2005, 2012; Yamazaki, 2008, 2009; Franke and Öztürk, 2015), and in the case of sym-
metrically informed contestants (e.g., Einy et al., 2016). For contests with incomplete information,
however, be it for discrete type spaces (e.g., Hurley and Shogren, 1998a, 1998b; Malueg and Yates,
2004; Schoonbeek and Winkel, 2006), for a continuously distributed common valuation (Harstad,
1995; Wärneryd, 2003, 2012; Rentschler, 2009), for continuously and independently distributed mar-
ginal costs (Fey, 2008; Ryvkin, 2010; Wasser, 2013a), or for continuously distributed interdependent
valuations (Wasser, 2013b), the results have been less comprehensive.
In related work, the rst-named author (2014) has shown that some of the results of the present
analysis extend to a framework with continuous type distributions in the tradition of Fey (2008) and
Ryvkin (2010). The analysis pursued in the present paper is more ambitious than that literature
in several ways. Indeed, private information in the analysis below may concern not only a marginal
cost parameter but also the contest technology, valuations, the shape of cost functions, and budget
constraints. Moreover, the present paper is not restricted to the IPV framework, but allows for a
very large variety of alternative information structures. Such exibility obviously leads to additional
complications also in the proofs.
Equilibrium existence has been studied also by Einy et al. (2015). There are three main di¤er-
ences to the present paper. First, the set-up di¤ers. While we consider nite state spaces, di¤eren-
tiable impact and cost functions, and the possibility of budgets constraints, they assume countable
information partitions, non-smooth technologies, and unrestricted budgets. Second, the approach to
existence is di¤erent. While we employ a simple limit argument, their proof checks general conditions
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for existence in discontinuous games. Third, the scope of the analysis di¤ers. While they focus on
existence, the present paper o¤ers, in addition, general conditions for uniqueness as well as a dis-
cussion of complementary issues such as mixed-strategy equilibria, symmetric contests, applications,
and the extent of rent dissipation.
3. Set-up
3.1 The contest
There are n  2 players, with representative i 2 N  f1; :::; ng. All uncertainty about the primitives
of the contest, such as the impact functions, valuations, cost functions, and budget constraints, is
summarized in a single state variable ! that is drawn ex ante from a nite state space 
. Each
player chooses an expenditure, or bid, xi  0 that directly translates via the state-contingent impact
function fi;! : R+ ! R+ into a number fi;!(xi) of lottery tickets.8 For expenditures x1  0; :::; xn 
0, player is probability of winning the contest in state ! is given by
pi;!(x1; :::; xn) =
fi;!(xi)
f1;!(x1) + :::+ fn;!(xn)
, (1)
provided that the denominator in (1) does not vanish. If, however, the denominator vanishes then
player is probability of winning is assumed to be equal to some arbitrary value pi;!(0; :::; 0) = p0i;! 2
[0; 1] such that
p01;! + :::+ p
0
n;!  1. (2)
These requirements at the origin are consistent, in particular, with popular specications for logit
contests where either p01;! = ::: = p
0
n;! =
1
n or where p
0
1;! = ::: = p
0
n;! = 0. Note that, in general, the
contest technology may be continuous for one state and discontinuous for another. To distinguish
these cases, we will say that the contest technology is discontinuous for ! when f1;!(0)+:::+fn;!(0) =
0. Player is payo¤, or net rent, in state ! is given by
i;!(x1; :::; xn) = pi;!(x1; :::; xn)vi(!)  ci;!(xi), (3)
where vi(!) > 0 denotes player is valuation of winning in state !, and ci;! : R+ ! R+ is player is
ex-post cost function in state !.
8State-contingent contest technologies may arise, for example, when players are uncertain about their abilities (Baik
and Shogren, 1995; Clark, 1997; Epstein and Mealem, 2013), or about the contest technology (Grossmann, 2014).
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3.2 Information structure
Each player i receives private information in the form of a signal i, or type, that is taken from a
corresponding signal space i. The signal i is the value i = ti(!) of a mapping ti : 
! i. Thus,
i may be thought of as the realization of the random variable ti. Signals are private information
of the respective contestants, i.e., player i does not observe the signal j = tj(!) of any other player
j 6= i. For convenience, we will write Pi(i) = f! 2 
jti(!) = ig for type is possibility set, i.e., for
the set of states in which player i observes the signal i. Thus, ! 2 Pi(i) is equivalent to ti(!) = i.
3.3 Budget constraints
Let xmaxi (i)  0 denote the budget of type i. In contrast to the other primitives of the model,
budgets obviously must be known interim, so they are not functions of the state of the world, but
of the type. Note that assuming a nite budget for all players in all states of the world does not
entail a loss of generality. Indeed, in the present setting, any budget may be chosen so large that
the corresponding constraint is never binding.9 In an extreme case, xmaxi (i) = 0, so that type i is
forced to remain inactive. As will be discussed below, this feature of a zero budget may be used, in
particular, to model population uncertainty. Note however that, in general, type i may nevertheless
win the prize with positive probability, viz. if pi;!(0; :::; 0) > 0 for some ! 2 Pi(i). To exclude this
to happen, the modeler may choose to assume pi;!(0; :::; 0) = 0 for all ! 2 Pi(i). Thus, the model
is exible in this respect.
A bid function for player i is a mapping i : i ! R+ such that i(i) 2 [0; xmaxi (i)]. The set
of player is bid functions is denoted by Bi. For a prole of bid functions  i = fjgj 6=i 2 B i =Q
j 6=iBj , denote by  i(t i(!)) = fj(tj(!))gj 6=i the corresponding prole of bids resulting in a given
state !, where t i(!) = ftj(!)gj 6=i. Similarly, for any  = figni=1 2 B =
Qn
i=1Bi, we shall write
(t(!)) = fi(ti(!))gni=1 for the corresponding prole of bids resulting in !, where t(!) = fti(!)gni=1.
3.4 Pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
Let q(!) > 0 denote the ex-ante probability of state !. The unconditional probability that signal i
realizes is given by qi(i) =
P
!2Pi(i)q(!). It is assumed that each possible realization of player is
signal occurs with positive probability, i.e., qi(i) > 0 for any i and i. Conditional on the signal i,
player i forms a posterior belief on 
, given by a probability qi(!ji) for each !. Hence, according
9 Indeed, with strictly increasing and convex cost functions that will be assumed throughout the present analysis,
there is a bid level that corresponds in costs to a players highest valuation. Clearly, any expenditure above that critical
level is strictly dominated by bidding zero. For a similar argument, see Yamazaki (2008).
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to Bayes rule, qi(!ji) = q(!)=qi(i) for any ! 2 Pi(i), and qi(!ji) = 0 otherwise. Note that
qi(!ji) > 0 is equivalent to ! 2 Pi(i), i.e., the support of type is posterior is just Pi(i).
The interim expected payo¤ for type i 2 i of player i is given by the conditional expectation
i(xi;  i; i) =
P
!2Pi(i)qi(!ji)i;!(xi;  i(t i(!))). (4)
By an incomplete-information contest C, we mean the Bayesian n-player game just described. A
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) in the incomplete-information contest C is a prole  2 B
such that
i(

i (i); 

 i; i)  i(xi;  i; i), (5)
for any i, any i, and any xi 2 [0; xmaxi (i)].
3.5 Mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium
Some of our results concern also mixed-strategy Nash equilibria, where each type of each player is
considered a separate randomizing agent. In other words, we will consider mixed strategies in the
agent normal form of the incomplete-information contest C. Following Dasgupta and Maskin (1986),
a mixed strategy bi for player i 2 N assigns to each type i 2 i a probability measure bi(i) over the
Borel subsets of the compact interval [0; xmaxi (i)]. Then, given that payo¤ functions are bounded
and almost everywhere continuous, the denitions of ex-post payo¤s i;!(:) and interim expected
payo¤s i(:; i) extend in the usual multilinear fashion to mixed strategies. A mixed-strategy Nash
equilibrium (MSNE) is a prole b = (b1; :::; bn) of mixed strategies, one for each player i = 1; :::; n,
such that i(bi (i); b

 i; i)  i(bi; b i; i), for any i, any i, and any mixed strategy bi for player
i. A MSNE b is called degenerate if the support of bi consists of a single bid function i 2 Bi, for
any i = 1; :::; n.
4. Existence
4.1 Assumptions
We start with the existence part. Two assumptions will be imposed. The rst one concerns impact
and cost functions.
Assumption (A) For all i and !, the function fi;! is twice di¤erentiable, strictly increasing, and
concave; for any i and !, the function ci;! is twice di¤erentiable, strictly increasing, and convex.
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The above assumption is standard, and can be found, in a similar form, in Szidarovszky and Okuguchi
(1997). As has been noted (see, e.g., Nti, 1999), convexity assumptions are actually needed for
existence of a PSNE under complete information when valuations are heterogeneous. The same is
true when valuations are private information, as discussed in Malueg and Yates (2004). Intuitively,
when the dispersion of valuations is large, then non-convex cost functions, for example, may lead to
non-existence of a PSNE because the respective low types face a high marginal cost of bidding, yet
by the usual discontinuity argument, it cannot be that all the players remain passive in equilibrium.
As will become clear, for most applications it su¢ ces to check Assumption (A). However, in order
to deal with more general cases in which zero-budget constraints are combined with discontinuous
technologies, we introduce the following second assumption.
Assumption (B) For any i and i with xmaxi (i) > 0, and for any ! 2 Pi(i), at least one of the
following two conditions holds: (i) the contest technology is continuous for !, (ii) there exists j 6= i
such that xmaxj (tj(!)) > 0.
Assumption (B) requires that any type endowed with a positive budget must assign probability one
to the event that either the contest technology is continuous or that there is at least one other player
with a positive budget. For an illustration, see Figure 1. Assumption (B) is indeed very mild. For
example, it holds when the contest technology is continuous for all states of the world. Further, the
assumption is satised when all budgets are positive.
Figure 1. Illustration of two possibility sets
4.2 Existence result
The rst main result of the present paper is the following.
Theorem 1. Under Assumptions (A) and (B), there exists a PSNE in the incomplete-information
contest.
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Proof. See the Appendix. 
Theorem 1 is proved by means of a simple limit consideration.10 Specically, for " > 0 small (i.e.,
smaller than any positive budget), assume that any type capable of being active is restricted to
submit a bid of at least ". Then, under Assumption (A), a standard result may be used to establish
the existence of a PSNE in the contest with minimum bid. Letting "! 0, a subsequence of PSNE in
the contests with minimum bid converges to a PSNE in the unrestricted contest, provided that the
limit strategy prole stays clear of the origin in any state of the world in which the contest technology
is discontinuous. But to see that the limit prole cannot be zero in such a state, it su¢ ces to note
that, with Assumption (B) in place, the marginal incentive to overbid for some player exceeds any
nite bound as the minimum bid shrinks to zero. This implication is due, of course, to the nature
of the logit contest technology that, in terms of marginal incentives, explodesfor bid vectors that
are close to the origin.
4.3 Discussion
It is fairly easy to see that Assumption (B) is crucial for existence when the prize is strictly shared
in the case of joint inactivity. For example, in a standard two-player Tullock contest with complete
information and p01 = p
0
2 =
1
2 , there is obviously no equilibrium if only one player has a positive
budget. Of course, that sort of example could be easily repairedby assuming that the penniless
player has a zero probability of winning. The following example, however, will show that, unless one
player is assumed to have an absolute privilege on the prize in the case of joint inactivity, Assumption
(B) cannot be dropped from the statement of Theorem 1 without invalidating the general conclusion.
Example 1. Consider a symmetric two-player lottery contest with independent private valuations
and two types for each player. As illustrated in Figure 2, the state space has four states, 
 =
f!LL; !LH; !HL; !HHg, which are all equally likely. Player is probability of winning the contest in
state ! is given by
pi;!(x1; x2) =
8><>:
xi
x1 + x2
if x1 + x2 > 0
p0i;! if x1 + x2 = 0,
(6)
where p0i;! 2 [0; 1] is arbitrary but xed, and such that p01;! + p02;!  1 for any !. Signal spaces are
1 = 2 = fL; Hg. The mapping t1 maps !LL and !LH to L, and !HL and !HH to H. Similarly,
10Precisely the same argument has been used before, even though in a slightly less explicit form, by Fey (2008, fn.
12) and Ryvkin (2010, p. 564) in a model with continuous type distributions. See also the discussion in Einy et al.
(2015, p. 242).
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t2 maps !LL and !HL to L, and !LH and !HH to H. Thus, the rst index of the state variable
corresponds to player 1s type (high or low), and the second index to player 2s type (likewise, high
or low). Playersvaluation functions are given by v1(!LL) = v1(!LH) = v2(!LL) = v2(!HL) = V L
and v1(!HL) = v1(!HH) = v2(!LH) = v2(!HH) = V H, where V H > V L > 0. Cost functions are
state-independent, and given by ci(xi) = xi. This game is known to admit a symmetric interior
PSNE with interesting properties (Malueg and Yates, 2004; Fey, 2008; Ludwig, 2012).
Figure 2. Information structure in Example 1
We now add a budget constraint for player 2s low type L by assuming xmax2 (
L) = 0, while the
budgets of the other three types remain su¢ ciently large to remain irrelevant. It is easy to see that
Assumption (B) does not hold. Indeed, the technology is discontinuous for all states of the world,
and any type of player 1 assigns positive probability to the event that she is the only player with
a positive budget. It is claimed that, for V H > 4V L, and for any specication of the probabilities
p0i;! 2 [0; 1) for any i and !, subject to the constraints p01;! + p02;!  1 for any !, a PSNE does
not exist. To see this, suppose that an equilibrium is given by bids xL1 , x
H
1 , x
L
2 , and x
H
2 . Clearly,
xL2 = 0, because of the budget constraint. Suppose rst that x
H
2 = 0. Then necessarily p
0
1;! = 1 for
any !, because otherwise at least one type of player 1 would not have a best response. We have a
contradiction. Suppose next that xH2 > 0. Since, by assumption, the budget constraint of type 
H
for player 2 does not bind, the necessary rst-order condition for an interior optimum,
1
2
xL1
(xH2 + x
L
1 )
2
+
1
2
xH1
(xH2 + x
H
1 )
2
=
1
V H
, (7)
must hold. Moreover, xH1 > 0, because otherwise x
H
1 = x
L
1 = 0, which renders the bid x
H
2 > 0
suboptimal. Clearly, unless p01;!LL = 1, we must have x
L
1 > 0. Since the budget constraints for player
1 are not binding, xL1 and x
H
1 satisfy the necessary rst-order conditions
1
2
xH2
(xL1 + x
H
2 )
2
=
1
V L
(8)
1
2
xH2
(xH1 + x
H
2 )
2
=
1
V H
. (9)
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Solving (8) and (9) for xL1 and x
H
1 , respectively, one obtains
xL1 =
r
xH2 V
L
2
  xH2 (10)
xH1 =
r
xH2 V
H
2
  xH2 : (11)
Plugging these expressions into (7), and simplifying, we arrive at
xH2 =
V L
2
(
r
V L
V H
+ 1)2
(2
V L
V H
+ 1)2
. (12)
But from (10), xH2  V L=2, which is in conict with (12) if V L=V H < 1=4. Thus, unless player 1 has
an absolute privilege on the prize in the case of joint inactivity, there is indeed no equilibrium.
5. Uniqueness
5.1 Assumptions
As has been noted, concavity is essential to uniqueness of equilibrium even in complete-information
contests (e.g., Pérez-Castrillo and Verdier, 1992; Cornes and Hartley, 2005). Naturally, the presence
of asymmetric information makes uniqueness even less likely. We will therefore impose Assump-
tion (A), as before. In addition, two additional assumptions will be made. The rst concerns the
information structure.
Assumption (C) There is a mapping v : 
! R++ and, for each i, a mapping i : i ! R++ such
that vi(!) = v(!)  i(ti(!)) for any !.
Assumption (C) requires that valuations may be expressed as a product of a common-value com-
ponent (that may depend on the state, yet not on the players identity), and of a private-value
component (that may depend on a players identity and type, yet not directly on the state). For
example, in a shared exploitation of a natural resource, v(!) might correspond to the total yield,
and i(i) to a rm-specic e¢ ciency parameter. The condition subsumes some of the information
structures that have been considered in the literature:
Independent private valuations. In this setting, the common-value component may be normalized
to one, i.e., v  1, and type realizations are independent across players. This setting clearly
fullls Assumption (C).
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Correlated private values. In a straightforward variation of the previous case, each player knows
her own valuation at the time of bidding, but the realizations of valuations are correlated
across players. Also this setting fullls Assumption (C), essentially because the probability
distribution over states of the world may be chosen in an arbitrary way.
Pure common values. In another setting, players share a common ex-post valuation of the prize
(e.g., because there is the possibility of resale), but players receive idiosyncratic signals. Thus,
there is incomplete and typically heterogeneous information about the valuation at the time of
bidding. Assumption (C) holds because the private-value components may be set to one, i.e.,
i  1 for i = 1; :::; n.
Interdependent valuations. Even the assumption of interdependent valuations is consistent with
Assumption (C). To see this, assume that v1 = 1 + 2 and v2 = 2 + 1, with 1 and
2 independent, and  > 0 xed. Provided that each player i = 1; 2 has only two possible
type realizations L and H with H > L > 0, this satises Assumption (C) when we set the
private-value components equal to
i(i) =

L + H if i = L
H + L if i = H ,
(13)
and the common-value component equal to
v(!) =
8>>>><>>>>:
1 if t1(!) 6= t2(!)
(1 + )H
H + L
if t1(!) = t2(!) = H
(1 + )L
L + H
if t1(!) = t2(!) = L.
(14)
However, there are also settings that are not consistent with Assumption (C). Consider, for example,
a variation of the above set-up with interdependent valuations, in which each of the two players has
three type realizations L, M , and H , with H > M > L > 0. Then, Assumption (C) implies
1(1) = 2(2) if 1 = 2.11 Moreover, dropping indices,
H + L
L + H
=
(H)
(L)
=
(H)=(M )
(L)=(M )
=
(H + M )(M + L)
(M + H)(L + M )
, (15)
which shows that Assumption (C) indeed fails to hold for any generic specication of the parameters.
Similarly, with n > 2 players, each of which has at least two types, and vi = i + 
P
l 6=il, it is easy
11 Indeed, from Assumption (C), v1(!) = v(!)  1(1) and v2(!) = v(!)  2(2). But if 1 = 2, then v1(!) =
(1 + )1 = (1 + )2 = v2(!). Hence, 1(1) = 2(2), as claimed.
11
to see that Assumption (C) cannot be satised for  > 0, because the ratio vi=vj , for j 6= i, depends
on some l with l 6= i and l 6= j.
Our second assumption concerns technologies.
Assumption (D) If the contest technology is discontinuous for !, then p0i;! < 1 for all i.
This assumption says that if players are jointly inactive in a state of the world for which the contest
technology is discontinuous, then there is no player that has an absolute privilege to the prize.
Assumption (D) is satised in most existing specications that have been used in the literature.
5.2 Uniqueness result
The second main result of the present paper is the following.
Theorem 2. Under Assumptions (A), (C), and (D), there exists at most one PSNE in the incomplete-
information contest. Moreover, there are no non-degenerate MSNE.
Proof. See the Appendix. 
The proof of Theorem 2 is long and complicated. One reason for the complications is that, as
discussed in the Introduction, contests of the logit form generally fail to satisfy the strict concavity
and continuity assumptions of Rosens theorem (1965).
The following outline provides an overview of the uniqueness proof. First, it is shown that it
su¢ ces to prove the claim under the assumption of pure common valuations. Indeed, a simple
transformation of the game, exploiting Assumption (C), allows any incomplete-information contest
to be re-cast as a contest with pure common valuations. Then, to prepare a proof by contradiction
in the tradition of Rosen (1965) and Ui (2016), we assume the existence of two distinct equilibria
 and , and consider the inner product of the di¤erence     with the payo¤ gradient in
the agent normal form, f@i(:; i)=@xigi2N ;i2i , where we replace any types marginal payo¤ by
zero whenever her budget is zero. See also Figure 3, which illustrates both the hypothetical vector
  and the concept of the payo¤ gradient in the example of a two-player complete-information
Tullock contest with asymmetric valuations and positive budgets.12 Next, it is observed that, as a
consequence of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for payo¤ maximization at the PSNE  and , the
12As should be clear by now, the payo¤ gradient eld of the logit contest has a singularity at the origin. The length
of the gradient vectors in Figure 3 has, therefore, been normalized to one.
12
inner product is zero or positive at  and zero or negative at  (e.g., the inner product will vanish
when the respective equilibrium is interior, etc.). To obtain a contradiction, it therefore remains to
be shown that the inner product is strictly declining on the straight path s that connects 0 = 
with 1 =  (see again Figure 3 for illustration). For this, we di¤erentiate the inner product with
respect to s, where the derivative can be shown to exist as a consequence of Assumption (D). As
usual, the di¤erentiation leads to an expression involving the Jacobian of the payo¤ gradient eld.
We now use Assumption (A) to verify that ex-post payo¤s satisfy Goodmans (1980) condition in
its usual form for all bid proles that possess at least two non-zero components, and in a somewhat
weaker form for all bid proles that lie on one of the axes (but not at the origin) of the space of joint
bid proles. Next, and this is one of the more involved parts of the proof, we need to check that
the inner product is strictly declining even if both  and  are located on the boundary of the
joint strategy space. To establish this property, we prove a crucial lemma saying that, for at least
one state ! in which the bid proles in the two equilibria  and  di¤er, there are two players
i 6= j such that each is active at ! in at least one of the two equilibria. It is then shown that the
existence of such a state su¢ ces to obtain the conclusion of Rosens theorem even if payo¤s are not
diagonally strict concave.
Figure 3. Illustration of the uniqueness proof
The second part of Theorem 2 says that there cannot be any Nash equilibrium in non-degenerate
mixed strategies. This is a more or less immediate consequence of the rst part. Indeed, if the
technology is discontinuous, x i = 0 cannot be believed with probability one (because there would
be no best response). Therefore, the expected payo¤ of each type i against any mixed equilibrium
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strategy prole of her opponents has, by Assumption (A), a negative second derivative over the
interval (0; xmaxi (i)], and is either continuous or jumps upwards at the origin. It follows that any
Nash equilibrium must be in pure strategies.13
6. Symmetric contests
Additional results can be obtained for symmetric contests. Consider an incomplete-information con-
test C with state space 
 = 1  :::  n, where 1 = ::: = n. Given any one-to-one mapping
 : N ! N , and any state ! = (1; :::; n), we may dene the permutedstate ! = ((1); :::; (n))
that results from exchanging players types according to the permutation . We will say that C
is symmetric if all the primitives of the contest are invariant with respect to arbitrary permuta-
tions of the player set, i.e., we require f(i);!(x(i)) = fi;!(xi), p0(i);! = p
0
i;!, v(i)(!
) = vi(!),
c(i);!(x(i)) = ci;!(xi), as well as xmax(i) ((i)) = x
max
i (i), for any i, any !, any , any xi, and
any x(i). Given a symmetric incomplete-information contest C, a PSNE  = (1 ; :::; n) is called
symmetric if 1 = ::: = n.
The following assumption is an alternative to Assumption (B) in symmetric contests.
Assumption (B) For any i and i with xmaxi (i) > 0 that, for at least one possible state, fails to
satisfy any of the two conditions (i) and (ii) given in Assumption (B), there exists a state ! 2 Pi(i)
and a player j 6= i with tj(!) = ti(!) such that the contest technology is discontinuous for !.
Thus, in a symmetric contest, Assumption (B) relaxes Assumption (B) in the sense that every type
with a positive budget may alternatively consider it possible that one of her opponents is of the same
type in a state for which the contest technology is discontinuous.
The following theorem is the third and nal main result of the present paper.
Theorem 3. Consider a symmetric incomplete-information contest C. Then, given Assumptions
(A), and (B), there exists a symmetric PSNE in C. If, in addition, Assumption (C) holds, then the
symmetric equilibrium is the unique PSNE.
Proof. See the Appendix. 
13 If contest technologies are continuous for all states of the world, the second part of Theorem 2 may be derived
alternatively by combining Lemma A.5 in the Appendix with Ui (2008, Cor. 6). However, that alternative proof does
not go through under the more general assumptions of Theorem 2.
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The reason why the alternative Assumption (B) works in a symmetric setting is that the sequence
of approximating equilibria in the contests with minimum bid may be chosen to be symmetric.
Therefore, if it is considered possible by one player that another player is in exactly the same situation,
then the limit of the sequence of symmetric equilibria cannot entail that all the players choose a zero
expenditure level in some state of the world. As noted above, Assumption (B) is less stringent than
Assumption (B) in a symmetric contest. However, as Example 1 has shown, Assumptions (A) and
(B) do not generally imply existence of a PSNE when the contest is not symmetric (but still all type
spaces are the same). As for uniqueness, it will be noted that Assumption (D) holds automatically
in any symmetric contest because p0i;!  1n < 1 for any i and !. Hence, in a symmetric contest, the
existence of at most one PSNE, and in fact, of at most one MSNE, follows already from Assumptions
(A) and (C).
The example below illustrates the benet of having an alternative condition for equilibrium
existence in symmetric contests.
Example 2. In Example 1, assume that budget constraints are given by xmax1 (
L) = xmax2 (
L) = 0,
while the budgets of the high types are assumed large. Assumption (B) does not hold because high
types assign positive probability of being matched with a penniless low type. However, there is no
problem here with existence because the game is symmetric and Assumption (B) holds. Indeed,
the necessary rst-order condition for an interior bid of the high types, xH  xH1 = xH2 , implies
that xH = V H=8, which is just half of a players expenditure in the symmetric lottery contest with
complete information. Intuitively, even though the high type considers it possible that the prize can
be won with an arbitrarily small positive bid, she also considers it possible that both contestants are
in an identical position.
7. Illustrations
This section reviews a number of specic settings in which Theorems 1 through 3 allow drawing new
conclusions.
7.1 Equilibria at the boundary
Hurley and Shogren (1998b) consider a two-player lottery contest with two types for one player and
three types for the other player. Types concern valuations of the players only, but type distributions
may be correlated. Using the index approach, they show that the incomplete-information contest
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allows at most one interior equilibrium. However, since their setting is one of private valuations (either
independent or correlated), it follows from Theorems 1 and 2 above that there is in fact exactly one
equilibrium. That equilibrium may be either interior, or it may be located at the boundary, as it
happens, e.g., when low-valuation types submit zero bids in anticipation of aggressive bidding by the
opponent, or when non-zero budget constraints are binding. Our results imply uniqueness regardless
of any boundary considerations.
7.2 Asymmetric equilibria
An immediate consequence of the uniqueness result is that a symmetric contest satisfying Assump-
tions (A) and (C) does not admit any asymmetric equilibrium. Consider, for instance, the model of
Malueg and Yates (2004), where the state-independent contest technology is given, for some exoge-
nous parameter r > 0, by
pi(x1; x2) =
8>><>>:
(xi)
r
(x1)r + (x2)r
if x1 + x2 > 0
:5 if x1 + x2 = 0,
(16)
The state space is as in Example 1 above, but probabilities are now given by q(!LL) = q(!HH) = 2
and q(!LH) = q(!HL) = 1 2 , where  2 [0; 1] is the usual correlation parameter. As Malueg and
Yates (2004) note, there is precisely one symmetric equilibrium in this framework, and it exists
in particular if r  1. We may now use Theorem 2 to conclude that the game does not possess
any asymmetric equilibrium for r  1. Indeed, a standard change of variables turns the Tullock
contest into a strategically equivalent lottery contest with cost functions ci(xi) = (xi)1=r, for which
Assumptions (A) and (C) do hold.14 Nor can there possibly be any non-degenerate mixed-strategy
equilibria in the framework of Malueg and Yates (2004) for r  1.
7.3 Population uncertainty
In a conict with population uncertainty, each player enters with some exogenous independent prob-
ability.15 As explained by Münster (2006, p. 355), such inactivitymay be thought of not only as
a lack of motivation (i.e., as having a zero valuation for the prize), but also as a lack of an essential
ability or endowment that is a needed for being able to compete in the contest. In fact, this intuitive
equivalence can be made precise by replacing any type with a zero valuation and an unlimited budget
14Note that the change in variable is actually needed to apply Theorem 1 for r < 1 because in this case, the impact
function of the Tullock contest has an innite slope at the zero expenditure level.
15Depending on the set-up, the potential number of contestants can be either nite (Münster, 2006; Lagerlöf, 2007;
Lim and Matros, 2009; Fu et al., 2011) or innite (Myerson and Wärneryd, 2006; Kahana and Klunover, 2015).
16
by a type with a positive valuation and a zero budget. Along these lines, it is straightforward to come
up with a model that has the same equilibrium set as Münsters original model, but also satises
Assumptions (A), (B) and (C) of Theorem 3. In this precise sense, our results guarantee equilibrium
existence and uniqueness also in models of population uncertainty. In fact, this nding extends to
the important case where stochastic participation is not necessarily independent across players.
7.4 Contests with resale
Sui (2009) considers contests with the possibility of resale. In substance, this means that, should
a player with a low valuation V L win the contest, she may o¤er the prize to the loser at price
(marginally below) V H, who will accept the o¤er if and only if she has a valuation of V H. Strictly
speaking, Sui (2009) proves neither existence nor uniqueness.16 To apply Theorems 1 and 2, say, note
that in the reduced form of Suis game, i.e., after replacing the resale stage by equilibrium payo¤s
in the second stage, each players value of winning is V L if both players have a low valuation of the
prize, and V H otherwise. In other words, the possibility of resale turns the contest stage into one of
a pure common valuation. As a consequence, we conclude that there is indeed a unique equilibrium
in the reduced form.
8. Concluding remarks
As the preceding illustrations may have shown, the main results of the present paper provide a
simple set of conditions su¢ cient for the existence of a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in
incomplete-information contests with or without budget constraints. While some of the assumptions
can probably be further relaxed, the conditions are certainly general enough to deal with most
applications that assume a discrete information structure.17
The analysis allows drawing potentially useful conclusions also regarding the expected net rent
in rent-seeking games of incomplete information. To see why, note that for any active type i, i.e.,
for any type that chooses a positive bid, there is a state ! 2 Pi(i) for which either the technology
is continuous, or for which the technology is discontinuous but some player j 6= i is active in !.
Therefore, is expected equilibrium payo¤ is a strictly concave function of own expenditure. Hence,
noting that inactivity generates a certain (normalized) payo¤ of zero, equilibrium activity must yield
16 Instead, he shows that the symmetric equilibrium, provided it exists, satises a system of two equations (which, in
principle, might have several or no solution, even if playersobjective functions are globally concave).
17However, the general analysis of uniqueness in a set-up with interdependent valuations remains an open issue.
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a positive payo¤. Thus, any player that is active with positive probability will realize a positive
expected net rent.
An important problem for future work is comparative statics. Comparative statics for contests
has been exhaustively studied in the case of complete information (see, e.g., Jensen, 2016) and in the
case of one-sided incomplete information (Hurley and Shogren, 1998a). For two-sided asymmetric
information, however, there are multiple e¤ects that are not straightforward to disentangle (Hurley
and Shogren, 1998b). Consequently, topics such as learning in contests (Pogrebna, 2008; Aoyagi,
2010), optimal bias (Drugov and Ryvkin, 2016), approximate solutions (Gallice, 2017), endogenous
timing with asymmetric information (Fu, 2006), transparency (Denter et al., 2011), the implications
of changes to the information structure (Serena, 2014; Denter and Sisak, 2015), and information
transmission (Slantchev, 2010, Kovenock et al., 2015; Zhang and Zhou, 2016) have recently become
very active elds of research.
There are several dimensions in which the present analysis could be usefully extended. For
instance, we did not consider productive e¤ort (Chung, 1996; Chowdhury and Sheremata, 2011; Hirai
and Szidarovszky, 2013), nor group contests (Fu et al., 2015; Brookins and Ryvkin, 2016). Some
generalization would be desirable also for the existence part. So far, the direct application of Renys
theorem to incomplete information contests has been only an expositional alternative. However, new
results of practical relevance for contest theory might be feasible by combining arguments specic
to contests with the insights of the more recent literature on equilibrium existence in discontinuous
games (e.g., Carbonell-Nicolau and McLean, 2015; He and Yannelis, 2015, 2016).
Appendix. Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. For " > 0, consider the contest with minimum bid C(") in which, for any
player i, the choice set of any type i with xmaxi (i) > 0 is restricted to ["; x
max
i (i)]. Clearly, for
" small enough, strategy spaces of the n-player game C(") are nonempty, convex, and compact.
Moreover, payo¤ functions in C(") are concave in own expenditure, as well as continuous for the
expenditure prole. Hence, a PSNE exists in C("), as follows from an application of the Nikaidô-
Isoda theorem (1955) to the agent normal form of C(").
Fix now a sequence f"mg1m=1 in R++ with limm!1 "m = 0, and select a PSNE m in C("m) for
each m. Since B is a compact subset of Euclidean space, the sequence fmg1m=1 (or a subsequence
thereof) converges to some  2 B. It is claimed that  is a PSNE in the original contest C, i.e., it
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is claimed that
i(

i (i); 

 i; i)  i(xi;  i; i), (17)
for any i, any i, and any xi 2 [0; xmaxi (i)]. Clearly, there is nothing to show if xmaxi (i) = 0.
Consider, therefore, some i and i with xmaxi (i) > 0. There are two cases.
Case 1. Suppose rst that xi > 0. Then, for m su¢ ciently large, xi  "m, and therefore, by the
equilibrium property of m in C("m), we have
i(
m
i (i); 
m
 i; i)  i(xi; m i; i), (18)
or equivalently,
P
!2Pi(i)qi(!ji)i;!(mi (i); m i(t i(!))) 
P
!2Pi(i)qi(!ji)i;!(xi; m i(t i(!))). (19)
Since xi > 0, the mapping i;!() is continuous at (xi;  i(t i(!))), for any ! 2 Pi(i). More-
over, by Assumption (B) and Lemma A.1 below, i;!() is likewise continuous at (t(!)), for
any ! 2 Pi(i). Hence, taking the limit m!1 in (19) implies (17).
Case 2. Suppose next that xi = 0. Clearly,
i(; 

 i; i)  i(0;  i; i)  E [ci;!()] + E [ci;!(0)] , (20)
for any bid  > 0, where expectations are formed with respect to qi(ji). Combining this with
i(

i (i); 

 i; i)  i(;  i; i), which was shown in Case 1, and subsequently letting  ! 0
proves (17) also in this case.
Thus, there is no protable deviation, and  is indeed a PSNE in C. 
The following lemma is used in the proof above.
Lemma A.1 Let ! 2 
 and players i 6= j such that xmaxi (ti(!)) > 0 and xmaxj (tj(!)) > 0. If the
contest technology is discontinuous for !, then necessarily (t(!)) 6= 0.
Proof. For any index m, we have pi;!(m(t(!))) + pj;!(m(t(!)))  1. Therefore, possibly after
renaming i and j, we know that pi;!(m(t(!)))  12 for innitely many m. Clearly, without loss of
generality, the inequality may be assumed to hold even for any m. A calculation shows that
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@pi;!(
m(t(!)))
@xi
=
@fi;!(
m
i (ti(!)))=@xi
f1;!(m1 (t1(!))) + :::+ fn;!(
m
n (tn(!)))
 f1  pi;!(m(t(!)))g (21)
 @fi;!(
m
i (ti(!)))=@xi
f1;!(m1 (t1(!))) + :::+ fn;!(
m
n (tn(!)))
 1
2
: (22)
Suppose that limm!1 m(t(!)) = 0. Since the derivative @fi;!=@xi is positive and bounded away
from zero, and since pi;!() is discontinuous at the origin, the right-hand side of (22) grows above
all bounds as m ! 1. Writing i = ti(!), this implies @i(mi (i); m i; i)=@xi ! 1 as m ! 1,
because vi(!) > 0, and because marginal costs are bounded. Hence, by the necessary Kuhn-Tucker
conditions, mi (i) = x
max
i (i) for any su¢ ciently large m. Thus, limm!1 
m
i (i) = x
max
i (i) > 0,
which yields the desired contradiction. 
Proof of Theorem 2. We claim rst that there is at most one PSNE in the incomplete-information
contest C. To prove this claim, note that maximizing type is expected payo¤
i(xi;  i; i) =
P
!2Pi(i)qi(!ji) fpi;!(xi;  i(t i(!)))vi(!)  ci;!(xi)g (23)
is, by Assumption (C), equivalent to maximizing type is expected payo¤ in units of her private-
valuation component, i(i) > 0. Formally,
i(xi;  i; i)
i(i)
=
P
!2Pi(i)qi(!ji)

pi;!(xi;  i(t i(!)))v(!)  ci;!(xi)
i(ti(!))

. (24)
Thus, we obtain a strategically equivalent normalized contest bC that is characterized by valuations
bvi(!) = v(!) and by cost functions bci;!(xi) = ci;!(xi)=i(ti(!)). Clearly, bC is a contest with a pure
common valuation that satises Assumption (A). Therefore, by Lemma A.2 below, there is at most
one PSNE in bC. In particular, there is at most one PSNE in C, which proves the claim.
Next, we claim that there are no non-degenerate MSNE. For this, let b = (b1; :::; bn) be a MSNE
in C. Take any player i and any type i. Since bi (i) is obviously degenerate if x
max
i (i) = 0, we
assume xmaxi (i) > 0. There are two cases.
Case 1. Suppose rst that, for any ! 2 Pi(i), we have  i(t i(!)) = 0 with probability one
under the equilibrium joint strategy b i. Then the optimization problem for type i, i.e.,
choosing a mixed strategy bi (i) such that i(b

i (i); b

 i; i) is maximized, has a solution only
if pi;!(0; :::; 0) = 1 for all ! 2 Pi(i). But then, bi (i) must indeed be degenerate, with all
probability being concentrated at the zero expenditure level.
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Case 2. Suppose next that there exists ! 2 Pi(i) such that b i(t i(!)) is not the Dirac measure
that concentrates all probability on the prole of zero bids. To see that bi (i) is degenerate, it
su¢ ces to show that the mapping xi 7! i(xi; b i; i) is strictly concave. Consider a joint bid
prole  i from the support of b i. If  i(t i(!)) 6= 0 for some ! 2 Pi(i), then i(xi;  i; i)
is strictly concave. Further, if  i(t i(!)) = 0 for all ! 2 Pi(i), then
i(xi;  i; i) =
P
!2Pi(i)qi(!j i) fpi;!(xi; 0 i)vi(!)  ci;!(xi)g (25)
is concave, because the mapping
pi;!(xi; 0 i) =

pi;!(0; :::; 0)  1 if xi = 0
1 if xi > 0
(26)
is concave. As a consequence, the mapping xi 7! i(xi; b i; i) is a convex combination of a
concave and strictly concave function, with positive weight on the strictly concave component.
Hence, xi 7! i(xi; b i; i) is indeed strictly concave.
Since both cases have been covered, this proves also the second claim, and hence, the theorem. 
The lemma below deals with the case of a pure common valuation.
Lemma A.2 If i  1 for all i 2 N , then there is at most one PSNE.
Proof. Suppose there are PSNE  and , with  6= . Consider the straight path dened by
s = s + (1   s), where s 2 [0; 1]. Using Lemma A.3 below, we may dene marginal interim
payo¤sfor type i of player i at the strategy prole s as
i(s; i) =
8>><>>:
@i(
s
i (i); 
s
 i; i)
@xi
if xmaxi (i) > 0
0 if xmaxi (i) = 0.
(27)
Consider now the inner product
s =
nX
i=1
X
i2i
qi(i)fi (i)  i (i)gi(s; i), (28)
Then, at s = 0, the necessary Kuhn-Tucker conditions for type i at the equilibrium 0 =  imply
that i (i) = 0 if i(0; i) < 0, and that 

i (i) = x
max
i (i) if i(0; i) > 0. It follows that 0  0.
Similarly, the necessary Kuhn-Tucker conditions at the equilibrium 1 =  imply that 1  0. To
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provoke a contradiction, we will show that s is strictly declining over the interval [0; 1]. For this,
let s 2 [0; 1]. Combining equation (27) with (40) from Lemma A.3 delivers
i(s; i) =
P
!2Pi(i)qi(!ji)i;!(s), (29)
where player is marginal ex-post payo¤sat state ! are given by
i;!(s) =
8>><>>:
@i;!(
s(t(!)))
@xi
if xmaxi (ti(!)) > 0
0 if xmaxi (ti(!)) = 0.
(30)
Plugging (29) into (28), and subsequently exploiting the identity qi(i)qi(!ji) = q(!), we nd
s =
nX
i=1
X
i2i
X
!2Pi(i)
q(!)fi (i)  i (i)gi;!(s). (31)
Since player is possibility sets Pi(i), for signals i ranging over the type set i, form a partition of
the state space 
, this may be written more compactly as
s =
nX
i=1
X
!2

q(!)zi(!)i;!(s), (32)
with zi(!) = i (ti(!)) i (ti(!)). Consider the set 
0 containing all ! such that (i) s(t(!)) 6= 0 for
all s 2 [0; 1], or (ii) the technology is continuous for !. Then, for any ! =2 
0, we have (t(!)) = 0
or (t(!)) = 0. Moreover, for any ! =2 
0, the technology is discontinuous for !. Therefore,
by Assumption (D) and the usual discontinuity argument, xmaxi (ti(!)) = 0 for all i, and hence,
i;!(s) = 0 for any i. Thus,
s =
nX
i=1
X
!2
0
q(!)zi(!)i;!(s), (33)
Consider next the derivative
@s
@s
=
nX
i=1
X
!2
0
q(!)
@i;!(s)
@s
zi(!). (34)
Fix for the moment some i and some ! 2 
0. If xmaxi (ti(!)) > 0, then
i;!(s) = vi(!)
@pi;!(
s
1(t1(!)); :::; 
s
n(tn(!)))
@xi
  @ci;!(
s
i (ti(!)))
@xi
, (35)
and a straightforward application of the chain rule for di¤erentiation, using sj (tj(!)) = 

j (tj(!))+
s  zj(!) for j 2 N , leads to
@i;!(s)
@s
= vi(!)
nX
j=1
@2pi;!(
s
1(t1(!)); :::; 
s
n(tn(!)))
@xj@xi
zj(!)  @
2ci;!(
s
i (ti(!)))
@x2i
zi(!).
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Multiplying through by zi(!), and subsequently using Assumption (A), one obtains
@i;!(s)
@s
zi(!)  vi(!)
nX
j=1
@2pi;!(
s(t(!)))
@xj@xi
zj(!)zi(!). (36)
If, on the other hand, xmaxi (i) = 0, then zi(!) = 

i (ti(!))  i (ti(!)) = 0, and (36) holds likewise.
Thus, (36) holds for any i and any ! 2 
0. Plugging this into (34), and exploiting that vi(!) = v(!)
for any i, one arrives at
@s
@s

nX
i=1
X
!2
0
q(!)vi(!)
nX
j=1
@2pi;!(
s(t(!)))
@xj@xi
zj(!)zi(!) (37)
=
X
!2
0
q(!)v(!)z(!)TJp;!(
s(t(!)))z(!), (38)
where z(!) = (z1(!); :::; zn(!))T , and Jp;!(x) is the n n-matrix whose element at the intersection
of row i and column j is @2pi;!(x)=@xi@xj . It su¢ ces to show that the right-hand side of (38) is
negative for s 2 (0; 1). By Lemma A.4, Jp;!(s(t(!))) + Jp;!(s(t(!)))T is negative semi-denite for
any ! 2 
. Hence, using Lemma A.7,
z(!)TJp;!(
s(t(!)))z(!)  0, (39)
for any s 2 [0; 1] and any ! 2 
. Moreover, by Lemma A.6, there is a state !0 2 
 such that
z(!0) 6= 0 and such that s(t(!0)) has two or more non-zero components for any s 2 (0; 1). Note
that ! 2 
0. Hence, using the respective strict versions of Lemmas A.4 and A.7, the right-hand side
of (38) is indeed seen to be negative for s 2 (0; 1). 
The remainder of this appendix consists of auxiliary results that are used in the proof of Lemma
A.2. The lemma below deals with the di¤erentiability of interim expected payo¤s.
Lemma A.3 If xmaxi (i) > 0, then the function xi 7! i(xi; s i; i) is di¤erentiable at xi = si (i)
for any s 2 [0; 1], with
@i(
s
i (i); 
s
 i; i)
@xi
=
P
!2Pi(i)qi(!ji)
@i;!(
s
i (i); 
s
 i(t i(!)))
@xi
. (40)
Proof. Let ! 2 Pi(i), and suppose that @i;!(s(t(!)))=@xi does not exist. Then, necessarily,
s(t(!)) = 0. Moreover, f1(0) = ::: = fn(0) = 0, and pi;!(0; :::; 0) < 1. Assume rst that s = 1,
so that s =  and, hence, (t(!)) = 0. Then, since xmaxi (i) > 0, type is inactivity cannot be
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optimal by the usual discontinuity argument. Assume next that s < 1. Then s(t(!)) = 0 implies
(t(!)) = 0, which is likewise impossible. This proves the lemma. 
The next lemma extends Goodmans (1980) argument.
Lemma A.4 For any !, the matrix Jp;!(x)+Jp;!(x)T is negative semi-denite for any x 2 Rn+nf0g,
and negative denite for any x 2 Rn+ possessing two or more non-zero components.
Proof. Take some x 2 Rn+nf0g. We wish to show that
Jp;!(x)+Jp;!(x)
T =
0BBBBB@
2
@2p1;!(x)
@x21
@2p2;!(x)
@x2@x1
+
@2p1;!(x)
@x2@x1
   @2pn;!(x)@xn@x1 +
@2p1;!(x)
@xn@x1
@2p1;!(x)
@x1@x2
+
@2p2;!(x)
@x1@x2
2
@2p2;!(x)
@x22
   @2pn;!(x)@xn@x2 +
@2p2;!(x)
@xn@x2
...
...
. . .
...
@2p1;!(x)
@x1@xn
+
@2pn;!(x)
@x1@xn
@2p2;!(x)
@x2@xn
+
@2pn;!(x)
@x2@xn
   2@2pn;!(x)
@x2n
1CCCCCA (41)
is negative semi-denite. A straightforward calculation shows that, as a consequence of Assumption
(A), @2pi;!=@x2i  0 over Rn+nf0g, for all i. Therefore, the diagonal matrix
M!(x) =
0BBBBBB@
@2p1;!(x)
@x21
0    0
0
@2p2;!(x)
@x22
...
...
. . . 0
0    0 @2pn;!(x)
@x2n
1CCCCCCA (42)
is negative semi-denite. Fix some k 2 N . From Lemma A.5 below, for xk > 0 xed, the mapping
x k 7! pk;!(xk; x k) is convex over Rn 1+ . Likewise, the mapping x k 7! pk;!(0; x k)  0 is convex
over Rn 1+ nf0g. Therefore, the corresponding Hessian matrix, i.e.,
Hk;!(x) =
0BBBBBBBBBBBB@
@2pk;!(x)
@x21
   @2pk;!(x)@xk 1@x1
@2pk;!(x)
@xk+1@x1
   @2pk;!(x)@xn@x1
...
. . .
...
...
...
@2pk;!(x)
@x1@xk 1   
@2pk;!(x)
@x2k 1
@2pk;!(x)
@xk+1@xk 1   
@2pk;!(x)
@xn@xk 1
@2pk;!(x)
@x1@xk+1
   @2pk;!(x)@xk 1@xk+1
@2pk;!(x)
@x2k+1
   @2pk;!(x)@xn@xk+1
...
...
...
. . .
...
@2pk;!(x)
@x1@xn
   @2pk;!(x)@xk 1@xn
@2pk;!(x)
@xk+1@xn
   @2pk;!(x)
@x2n
1CCCCCCCCCCCCA
, (43)
is positive semi-denite. In other words, zT kHk;!(x)z k  0 for any z k = (z1; :::; zk 1; zk+1; :::; zn)T 2
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Rn 1. Consider now the matrix
H0k;!(x) =
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
@2pk;!(x)
@x21
   @2pk;!(x)@xk 1@x1 0
@2pk;!(x)
@xk+1@x1
   @2pk;!(x)@xn@x1
...
. . .
...
...
...
...
@2pk;!(x)
@x1@xk 1   
@2pk;!(x)
@x2k 1
0
@2pk;!(x)
@xk+1@xk 1   
@2pk;!(x)
@xn@xk 1
0    0 0 0    0
@2pk;!(x)
@x1@xk+1
   @2pk;!(x)@xk 1@xk+1 0
@2pk;!(x)
@x2k+1
   @2pk;!(x)@xn@xk+1
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
@2pk;!(x)
@x1@xn
   @2pk;!(x)@xk 1@xn 0
@2pk;!(x)
@xk+1@xn
   @2pk;!(x)
@x2n
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
. (44)
It is straightforward to check that zTH0k;!(x)z = z
T
 kHk;!(x)z k  0 for any z = (z1; :::; zn)T 2 Rn.
Thus, the matrix H0k;!(x) is likewise positive semi-denite. Summing now over k = 1; :::; n, we obtain
that
nX
k=1
H0k;!(x) =
0BBBBBB@
P
k 6=1
@2pk;!(x)
@x21
P
k 6=2;1
@2pk;!(x)
@x2@x1
   Pk 6=n;1 @2pk;!(x)@xn@x1P
k 6=1;2
@2pk;!(x)
@x1@x2
P
k 6=2
@2pk;!(x)
@x22
...
...
. . .
...P
k 6=1;n
@2pk;!(x)
@x1@xn
      Pk 6=n @2pk;!(x)@x2n
1CCCCCCA . (45)
Since x 6= 0, we have Pnk=1 pk;!(x) = 1 and, consequently, Pnk=1 @2pk;!(x)@xi@xj = 0 for arbitrary i and j.
Hence,
 
nX
k=1
H0k;!(x) =
0BBBBBB@
@2p1;!(x)
@x21
@2p1;!(x)
@x2@x1
+
@2p2;!(x)
@x2@x1
   @2p1;!(x)@xn@x1 +
@2pn;!(x)
@xn@x1
@2p1;!(x)
@x1@x2
+
@2p2;!(x)
@x1@x2
@2p2;!(x)
@x22
...
...
. . .
...
@2p1;!(x)
@x1@xn
+
@2pn;!(x)
@x1@xn
      @2pn;!(x)
@x2n
1CCCCCCA . (46)
Thus, Jp;!(x) + Jp;!(x)T = M!(x)  
Pn
k=1H
0
k;!(x) is indeed negative semi-denite for any x 2
Rn+nf0g. Let now x 2 Rn+ possess two or more non-zero components. Then, x i 2 Rn 1+ nf0g for all
i 2 N . In this case, therefore, M!(x) is negative denite, and so is Jp;!(x) + Jp;!(x)T . 
The following lemma establishes an important convexity property of contests with more than two
contestants.
Lemma A.5 Impose Assumption (A). Then, for any i 2 N , any ! 2 
, and any xi > 0, the
mapping x i 7! pi;!(xi; x i) is convex on Rn 1+ .
Proof. The mapping x i 7!
P
j 6=i fj;!(xj) is concave on R
n 1
+ , as can be seen by noting that the
corresponding Hessian is a diagonal matrix with weakly negative entries. Further, for xi > 0 xed,
25
the mapping y 7! xixi+y is convex and decreasing on R++. The claim follows now from (Rockafellar,
1970, Theorem 5.1). 
The following crucial lemma says that any two distinct equilibria must entail, in some state of the
world, di¤erent bids for at least two players.
Lemma A.6 There exists ! 2 
 such that z(!) = (t(!))   (t(!)) 6= 0 and such that for any
s 2 (0; 1), the vector s(t(!)) has two or more non-zero components.
Proof. Since  6= , there exist i and i such that i (i) 6= i (i). Clearly, for any ! 2 Pi(i),
we have zi(!) = i (ti(!))   i (ti(!)) 6= 0, so that z(!) 6= 0. Therefore, to prove the lemma, it
su¢ ces to show that there exists an ! 2 Pi(i) such that for any s 2 (0; 1), the vector s(t(!)) has
two or more non-zero components. To provoke a contradiction, suppose that, for any ! 2 Pi(i),
there is some s 2 (0; 1) such that s i(t i(!)) = 0. Then, clearly,  i(t i(!)) =  i(t i(!)) = 0 for
any ! 2 Pi(i). If either xmaxi (!) = 0, or xmaxi (!) > 0 and type is payo¤ function is continuous at
the origin, then i (i) = 

i (i) = 0, which is impossible. If, however, x
max
i (!) > 0 and type is
payo¤ function is discontinuous at the origin, then player i has no best response, which is impossible
as well. The contradiction proves the claim, and hence, the lemma. 
The nal lemma recalls two simple matrix-theoretic facts.
Lemma A.7 Let J be an n n-matrix such that J + JT is negative semi-denite. Then zTJz  0
for any z 2 Rn. If J + JT is even negative denite, then zTJz < 0 for any z 2 Rnnf0g.
Proof. Clearly, zTJz = ((zTJ)z)T = zT (zTJ)T = zTJT (zT )T = zTJT z. Therefore, 2zTJz =
zTJz + zTJT z = zT (Jz + JT z) = zT (J + JT )z. The two assertions are now immediate. 
Proof of Theorem 3. (Existence) Since C is symmetric, so is C("), for any " > 0. Hence, by a
symmetric variant of the Nikaidô-Isoda theorem (Moulin, 1986, pp. 115-116; Becker and Damianov,
2006), there exists a symmetric PSNE in C("). Next, as in the proof of Theorem 1, consider a
converging subsequence of symmetric equilibria in the games C("), where " ! 0. Denote the limit
by . Clearly,  is a symmetric strategy prole in C. Take any i and i such that xmaxi (i) > 0,
and let ! 2 Pi(i). It su¢ ces to prove that, also under the relaxed condition of Assumption (B),
the mapping i;!() is continuous at (t(!)). For this, let !0 2 Pi(i) such that the contest
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technology is discontinuous for !0 and such that ti(!0) = tj(!0). Then, since the contest is symmetric,
xmaxj (tj(!
0)) = xmaxi (ti(!
0)) = xmaxi (i) > 0. The claim follows now from Lemma A.1. (Uniqueness)
As discussed in the text, the symmetric context C satises Assumption (D). Uniqueness follows,
therefore, directly from Theorem 2. 
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